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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Larry Dean Corwin appeals from the district court's denial, following an 
evidentiary hearing, of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that 
the district court erred by dismissing his claim that his conviction of felony driving under 
the influence with two prior DUls in ten years violated his substantive due process 
rights, and that the court abused its discretion by neglecting to rule on a request to 
appoint substitute counsel at state's expense. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In 1998, Corwin was convicted of driving under the influence in Idaho. (R., p.73.) 
In 1999, Corwin was convicted of driving under the influence in Washington. (R., p.79.) 
In 2007, Corwin was again arrested for driving under the influence in Idaho. (#34932 
R., pp.4-6. 1) The state charged Corwin with, among other things, driving under the 
influence with a felony enhancement alleging two prior convictions for driving under the 
influence within the past 10 years. (#34932 R., pp.32-35.) Following a jury trial, Corwin 
was convicted of felony driving under the influence. (R., pp.163-64.) 
Corwin appealed his judgment. (R., p.4.) His judgment was affirmed, and 
remittitur entered on September 28, 2009. (Id.) 
On September 15, 2010, Corwin filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief 
alleging that his conviction for felony DUI deprived him of substantive due process and 
1 The district court took judicial notice of Corwin's underlying criminal case, CR2007-
14070 (Tr., p.1, Ls.8-10), which corresponds to Supreme Court Docket No. 34932. 
Contemporaneous with the filing of this brief, the state filed a motion requesting the 
Court to take judicial notice of the record in Docket No. 34932. 
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that his counsel was ineffective. (R., pp.3-20.) The district court provided its notice of 
intent to dismiss Corwin's petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.84-93.) Corwin 
responded that he had raised a genuine issue fact in regards to one of his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. (R., pp.99-104.) The district court held an evidentiary 
hearing on that ineffective assistance of counsel claim and summarily dismissed the 
other claims. (R., pp.157-59, 164; see also Tr.) Following the evidentiary hearing, the 
district court dismissed Corwin's petition. (R., pp.163-71, 182.) 
Corwin filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.173-75.) 
2 
ISSUES 
Corwin states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Is the use of expired criminal evidence by unreasonable application 
of a legislative act, reprehensible and objectionable to the interest of 
finality in constitutional conclusions of guilty pleas, the substantive due 
process doctrine, and the ex post facto clause? 
2. Should the district court have resolved a conflict of interest issue, 
and substituted counsel before addressing the claims on their merits? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Corwin failed to show error in the district court's dismissal of his claim that 
his conviction of felony DUI violated his substantive due process rights? 
2. Has Corwin failed to show reversible error in the district court's failure to rule on 
his motion to appoint substitute counsel at state's expense before deciding the merits of 
Corwin's petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Cor\vin Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Dismissal Of His Claim That 
His Conviction Violated His Due Process Rights 
A Introduction 
Cor\Vin was convicted of misdemeanor DU ls in 1997 and 1998, respectively. (R., 
pp.73, 79.) Under Idaho Code§ 18-8005(5) at the time of his convictions, a third DUI 
offense committed within five years could be charged as a felony. In 2006, the Idaho 
legislature amended Idaho Code § 18-8005(5) by enlarging the timeframe from five 
years to ten years. In 2007, Cor\Vin was convicted of a third DUI by jury verdict. (R., 
p.163.) The district court then entered a verdict convicting him of the felony DUI 
enhancement under Idaho Code§ 18-8005(5). (R., pp.163-64.) 
Following his conviction and subsequent appeal, Cor\Vin filed a petition for post-
conviction relief alleging, inter a!ia, that his conviction violated his substantive due 
process rights. (R., pp.4-5.) The district court summarily dismissed this claim. (R., 
pp.164-66.) On appeal, Cor\Vin argues that the district court erred by dismissing this 
claim. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-15.) Application of the correct legal standards to the facts 
of this case, however, shows no error by the district court. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidenUary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file 
.... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
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C. Corwin Is Not Entitled To Post-Conviction Relief 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a 
new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; 
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). Generally, the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for post-conviction relief. Pizzuto v. 
State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). However, unlike other civil 
complaints, in post-conviction cases the "application must contain much more than a 
short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 
8(a)(1)." Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)). 
Instead, the application must be supported by a statement that "specifically set[s] forth 
the grounds upon which the application is based." kl (citing I.C. § 19-4903). 'The 
application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its 
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 
548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own initiative. "To 
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence 
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a 
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claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal "if the applicant's 
evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's 
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing LC. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a petitioner's 
unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept either the applicant's 
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. 
State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). The trial court is not required to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition when the alleged facts, 
even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief. kt (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 
865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are 
insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of 
the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." kt 
Below, Corwin argued that his conviction for felony DUI deprived him of 
substantive due process because, he alleged, when he pleaded guilty to the earlier 
DUls, he was guaranteed that after a five year period those convictions would no longer 
be admissible. (R., pp.4-5.) The district court interpreted Corwin's argument as a 
contention that his conviction for felony DUI under the amended statute violated his plea 
agreement under the contract clause. (R, pp.164-65.) This was one of the issues 
directly addressed by the Court of Appeals in State v. Lamb, 14 7 Idaho 133, 206 P .3d 
497 (Ct. App. 2009). In that case, the Court explained: 
The notion that the trial courts' warnings given in his prior DUI cases 
somehow became part of Lamb's plea agreements is frivolous. A trial 
court's advisement of the risk of future penalties under a recidivist statute 
is a warning designed to deter the defendant from committing future 
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offenses, not a promise that puts restraints on future prosecutions. It 
certainly does not constitute a promise that the law will, with respect to the 
defendant, never change. 
kl at 137, 206 P.3d at 501 (emphasis original, citation omitted). 
Corwin's claim was indistinguishable from the claim raised by the defendant in 
Lamb. The legal merits of Corwin's claim were already weighed and rejected by the 
Court. The district court, relying on Lamb, properly dismissed Corwin's claim that his 
conviction violated his substantive due process rights under the contracts clause. (R., 
pp.164-66.) 
On appeal, Corwin now claims that the district court misinterpreted his argument, 
asserting that he argued that the statute's amendment violated the ex post facto clause, 
not the contracts clause. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-15.) Under the circumstances of this 
case, that is a distinction without a difference. In fact, this is the other issue that was 
decided by the Court of Appeals in State v. Lamb. 
As explained by the Court in Lamb: 
Lamb is not being prosecuted for any offense which he committed before 
the 2006 amendment to I.C. § 18-8005(5). His exposure to prosecution 
for the present offense had not even arisen, let alone expired, when the 
statute was amended. Lamb's arguments notwithstanding, he is not being 
punished in the present case for the offenses he committed in 2001 and 
2003. He has been prosecuted only for the DUI that he committed in 
2007, about a year after the Idaho legislature amended the statute. 
kl at 136, 206 P.3d at 500. Likewise, Corwin was not prosecuted or punished in this 
case for his DU!s in 1997 and 1998. He was prosecuted for the DUI he committed in 
2007, about a year after the Idaho legislature amended the statute. That prosecution 
(and subsequent conviction) does not violate the ex post facto clause. 
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Again, Corwin's claim is indistinguishable from the claim raised by the defendant 
in Lamb. The legal merits of that claim have already been weighed and rejected. The 
Court of Appeals, following the precedent of the United States Supreme Court, the 
Idaho Supreme Court, and virtually every other jurisdiction that has decided the issue, 
has already determined that the amendment at issue in this case did not violate the ex 
post facto clause. kl at 135-36, 206 P.3d at 499-500. The statute is constitutional and 
its application to Garwin's case does not violate due process. The district court properly 
dismissed this claim and should be affirmed. 
11. 
Corwin Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Committed Reversible Error By 
Failing To Rule On His Motion To Appoint Substitute Counsel At State's Expense 
Before Ruling On The Merits Of Garwin's Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
During the post-conviction proceedings, Corwin filed a "notice of conflict" with his 
attorney. (R., pp.112-14.) Later, Corwin withdrew that notice (R., p.133) and instead 
filed a motion to appoint substitute counsel at state's expense (R., pp.134-36). No 
action on that motion is reflected in the record. 2 The district court subsequently held an 
evidentiary hearing and, ultimately, denied Garwin's petition. (R., pp.157-59, 163-71, 
182.) On appeal, Corwin argues that the district court abused its discretion by not ruling 
on his motion to appoint substitute counsel at state's expense before ruling on the 
merits of Corwin's petition. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-19.) Application of the correct legal 
standards shows no reversible error by the district court. 
2 The register of actions reflects that a status conference was held on June 29, 2012, 
between the filing of the motion to appoint substitute counsel and the evidentiary 
hearing. (R., p.2.) However, no minutes or other record of this conference is in the 
appellate record. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in 
the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." I.R.C.P. 61. 
C. Corwin Has Failed To Show That The District Court Violated His Substantial 
Rights By Failing To Rule On His Motion To Appoint Substitute Counsel 
Corwin alleges that the district court abused its discretion by not ruling on his 
motion to appoint substitute counsel at state's expense before addressing the merits of 
his petition for post-conviction relief. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-19.) In Hust v. State, 147 
Idaho 682, 214 P.3d 668 (Ct. App. 2009), the Court of Appeals made clear 
that any time a district court dismisses a petition for post-conviction relief 
on either substantive or procedural grounds without first addressing the 
petitioner's request for post-conviction counsel (assuming the petitioner 
made such a request), the court commits an abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 685, 214 P.3d at 671 (emphasis original). There is no reason, however, to apply 
the same standard to motions to appoint substitute counsel at state's expense, 
especially where the petitioner fails to precipitate action on the motion but instead 
stands silent on that motion in subsequent proceedings. The bases of Corwin's motion 
were that counsel had failed to adequately familiarize himself with the underlying 
criminal case or the law, and failed to take certain steps Corwin felt appropriate. (R., 
pp.134-36.) Nine months later, however, Corwin was still accepting the representation 
of his court-appointed post-conviction counsel during his evidentiary hearing without 
voicing any objection. (See Tr.) Under the circumstances of this case, Corwin's actions 
(and inactions) should be viewed as a waiver of his request for the appointment of 
substitute counsel. 
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Even assuming that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule on 
Corwin's motion for substitute counsel at state's expense before deciding the merits of 
Corwin's petition for post-conviction relief, any error would be harmless. Post-conviction 
actions are civil proceedings, under which the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply. 
Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). Harmless error is 
defined by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, in pertinent part, as: 
No error ... or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or 
omitted by the court ... is ground for ... vacating, modifying, or otherwise 
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears 
to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage 
of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding 
which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
I.R.C.P. 61. 
There is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). Even the Sixth Amendment, which 
gives defendants a right to competent counsel in criminal trials, does not equate to the 
counsel of one's choice, and "mere lack of confidence in otherwise competent counsel 
is not necessarily grounds for substitute counsel in the absence of extraordinary 
circumstances." State v. Gamble, 146 Idaho 331, 336, 193 P.3d 878, 883 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citations omitted). Rather, to be successful, motions for appointment of 
substitute counsel require a showing of good cause. I.C. § 19-856 ("At any stage, 
including appeal or other post-conviction proceeding, the court concerned may for good 
cause assign a substitute attorney"). Corwin did not make a showing of good cause for 
the appointment of substitute counsel. Any defect in failing to rule on his motion before 
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deciding the merits of his petition for post-conviction relief therefore did not affect 
substantial rights and must be disregarded. 
Corwin appears to allege that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.16-19.) A showing that counsel is ineffective may be good cause 
to appoint substitute counsel. To show ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner 
must show that his attorney's performance was objectively deficient and that he was 
prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988). Corwin has 
failed to show any deficiency in post-conviction counsel's performance, or any prejudice 
he suffered as a result of that performance. Initially, Corwin alleged that his attorney 
was inadequately prepared because he referred to a withdrawal of a nonexistent guilty 
plea, and ignorant of the law because counsel believed there was little merit to Corwin's 
substantive due process claim. (R., pp.134-36.) If post-conviction counsel was 
inadequately prepared in February for Corwin's case, he had cured that deficiency by 
the November evidentiary hearing he secured in Corwin's behalf. (See Tr., p.108, Ls.2-
21.) Furthermore, as demonstrated above, post-conviction counsel was correct in 
regards to the legal merits of Corwin's substantive due process claim. (See Argument I, 
supra.) Corwin therefore failed to show that his post-conviction counsel rendered 
deficient performance. 
Corwin also failed to show prejudice. Reviewing his motions below, Garwin's 
argument is essentially that he and his counsel had a difference of opinion regarding 
what trial strategy would be most successful in presenting his post-conviction claims. 
(See R., pp.112-14.) A difference in strategy does not constitute ineffective assistance 
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of counsel and is not sufficient cause to appoint substitute counsel at state's expense. 
Failure to rule on Corwin's motion to appoint substitute counsel, based on differences of 
strategy, did not prejudice Corwin's rights and is therefore harmless. 
On the merits of Corwin's strategy, his argument fails. Corwin wanted to present 
claims of factual and legal innocence regarding his felony DUI conviction. (R., pp.118-
24.) Under the circumstances of this case, neither approach would have justified relief 
as a matter of law. Regarding his factual guilt, Corwin essentially wanted to argue 
during his post-conviction proceedings that there was insufficient evidence presented at 
trial to sustain his conviction. (R., pp.118-20.) Post-conviction relief proceedings are 
not a substitute for proceedings in the trial court, or for an appeal from the sentence or 
conviction. Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 430, 835 P.2d 661, 665 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(citing I.C. § 19-4901 (b)). A claim that Corwin's conviction was based on insufficient 
evidence is the type of claim that should have been brought on direct appeal and, 
absent some new evidence, is not proper in post-conviction proceedings. Regardless, 
because post-conviction counsel secured an evidentiary hearing in Corwin's behalf, 
Corwin was still able to present all of his factual innocence claims and arguments. (See 
Tr., p.5, L.11 - p.58, L.1.) Corwin therefore cannot claim prejudice from his post-
conviction counsel's decision to focus resources on Corwin's one colorable claim rather 
than this frivolous claim. 
Corwin also wanted to challenge his conviction on legal grounds, under a theory 
that his conviction violated his due process rights. (R., pp.116, 121-22.) As shown 
above, this argument fails as a matter of law. (See Argument I, supra.) Post-conviction 
counsel's decision not to waste resources in pursuing this frivolous claim did not 
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prejudice Corwin and does not constitute grounds for the appointment of substitute 
counsel at state's expense. 
Because Corwin failed to show that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective, 
he was not entitled to the appointment of substitute counsel at state's expense. The 
district court's failure to rule on Corwin's motion for substitute counsel, when he was not 
entitled to substitute counsel, did not prejudice Corwin's rights and is harmless. Even if 
the district court abused its discretion by omitting a ruling on Corwin's motion to appoint 
substitute counsel, that omission must therefore be disregarded. 
Corwin has failed to show that a district court, in a civil proceeding, is required to 
rule on a motion for appointment of substitute counsel at state's expense where the 
movant fails to precipitate action on that motion. Even if a district court is required to 
rule on such a motion, the failure of the district court to rule on that motion in this case is 
harmless error because it did not prejudice Corwin's substantial rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
dismissing, after an evidentiary hearing, Garwin's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 14th day of November, 2013. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of November, 2013, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRI OF RESPONDENT by placing a copy in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
LARRY DEAN CORWIN 
IDOC #35015 
ICC - G105B 
PO Box 70010 
Boise, ID 83707 
RJS/mg 
~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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